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Gail McElroy (Dublin)
Committees and Party Cohesion in the European Parliament
Wie sichern politische Parteien in sich neu herausbildenden gesetzgebenden Körperschaf-
ten Parteidisziplin und -kohäsion? In etablierten parlamentarischen Demokratien besitzen 
Parteien häufig ein so hohes Niveau an Einheitlichkeit, dass der Frage, wie und warum eine 
solche Parteidisziplin entsteht, bis zuletzt wenig Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt wurde. In sich 
neu herausbildenden gesetzgebenden Körperschaften ist die Transformation von rudi-
mentären Parteiorganisationen in disziplinierte Parteien jedoch keine zwangsläufige. 
Dieser Artikel untersucht, ob die politischen Gruppen im Europäischen Parlament (EP) 
Versuche unternehmen, Parteidisziplin durchzusetzen. Spezifischer untersucht der Beitrag, 
ob MEPs, die laufend gegen die eigene Partei stimmen, von dieser im Rahmen des Proz-
esses der Ausschussentsendung im EP bestraft werden.
Keywords:  political parties, European Parliament, party discipline 
politische Parteien, Europäisches Parlament, Parteidisziplin 
Perhaps [the] biggest obstacle – one of the Parliament’s biggest failings – is indiscipline among the Politi-
cal Groups […]. Although the groups have coalesced a bit over the years, so that there are now only four 
that really count, they will never be able to exert real control over members until they correspond to and 
fight elections as genuine European-wide parties. Such a change could take decades. 
The Economist, January 11th 1997.
There are signs, albeit somewhat patchy ones, that pan-European political groups are emerging as genuine 
political actors.
The Economist, January, 18th 2007.
1.  Introduction
How do political parties enforce party discipline and promote cohesiveness in newly emerging 
legislatures? Political parties in established parliamentary democracies typically exhibit such 
high levels of unity that the question of how and why such discipline arises has, until recently, 
received little attention (Bowler et al. 1999). But in emerging legislatures the process of trans-
forming rudimentary party organisations into disciplined parties is not inevitable. This article 
examines if the political groups in the European Parliament (EP) attempt to enforce party disci-
pline? Specifically, the paper asks the question are MEPs who consistently vote against the 
party punished in terms of the committee assignments they obtain? The conventional wisdom, 
as indicated in the opening quote, is that the political groups in the EP are weak an ineffectual, 
little more than collections of national parties. 
The literature on political parties and party discipline suggests that cohesive voting blocs 
are central to the functioning of any legislature. With reference to the EP, however, “the usual 
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range of incentives and inducements open to parties to help shape action en bloc seem to be 
lacking” (Bowler et al. 1999, 209). First, the institutional imperatives that typically operate in 
parliamentary democracies are missing. Normally, the need to keep a governing party in power 
acts as a powerful incentive for maintaining a majority-voting bloc. But within the EP no ex-
ecutive rests on the support of a majority party. Second, the political groups cannot sanction rebel 
members through the electoral nomination process. Where a party controls the nomination proc-
ess, it can encourage cohesion through the selection and de-selection of “problem” candidates 
(Gallagher/Marsh 1988). However, the political groups in the EP have no direct control over 
access to the ballot in the twenty-seven member states. Finally, the supply of political goods, to 
which the political groups have access, is highly constrained. Most notably, the political groups 
do not have funds at their disposal to finance members’ election campaigns: election campaigns 
are funded according to domestic election laws in the member states. As a result, not surpris-
ingly, the political groups in the European Parliament fare poorly, in terms of cohesion and 
discipline, when compared with their counterparts in the national legislatures of Europe.  None-
theless, levels of cohesion have been rising over time (Hix et al. 2007). Given the highly con-
strained environment in which the political groups operate how has this been achieved? 
Cox and McCubbins (1993) have made a forceful argument in the case of the US House of 
Representatives that parties can encourage party discipline through the institutions of the legis-
lature itself. Through the use of patronage, in particular the committee system, parties can create 
incentives for members to vote in unison. This process operates on two levels. First, party ren-
egades can be punished through the patronage system by being denied “plum positions”. Second, 
parties that act in unison have an advantage over divided parties as they can gain control of the 
institution itself and the rules that define it. This paper examines whether or not the political 
groups in the European Parliament have taken advantage of the internal organization of the EP, 
in particular the committee system, to encourage tighter party discipline. Specifically, the paper 
asks the question is there a relationship between an MEP’s loyalty to his party and the value of 
his committee assignment? 
This article has three principle objectives. First, it aims to extend our understanding of the 
internal organisation of the EP itself. Despite evidence (Corbett et al. 2007; Judge/Earnshasw 
2003; McElroy 2007) that committees play an important role in the legislative process in the 
European Parliament, our understanding of the importance of the committee system remains 
underdeveloped. Second, the paper will demonstrate that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the 
main political groups in the European Parliament made a conscious effort to control their mem-
bers quite early in the Parliament’s history. Third, the paper aims to contribute to the literature 
on party development and party organisation more generally. 
This paper proceeds as follows: First, a brief overview of the EP committee system and 
assignment process is provided along with further elaboration of the theoretical model. Second, 
a rank orderings of committees in the EP is derived. Third, the data and key variables are outlined 
and the empirical results are presented and discussed. Fourth, the robustness of the results is 
tested. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of possible extensions of the current work 
and the significance of the findings.
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2.  The EP Committee System and the Assignments process
Committees have played a central role in the EP from the outset. The Common Assembly of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the antecedent of the modern Parliament, 
recognised that committees would help alleviate the problems inherent in co-ordinating work 
in an Assembly which was scheduled to meet in plenary only a handful of times a year. To this 
end, it created seven committees to conduct Assembly business in January of 1953. The estab-
lishment of the European Parliament after the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome (1957) 
brought substantial change to the number, names and prestige of committees, in an effort to 
reflect the wider areas of responsibility of the European Economic Community. Further expan-
sion of the committee system occurred in the aftermath of the first direct elections. At the same 
time as the membership of the Parliament expanded from 200 to 410 members, the number of 
standing committees was increased from twelve to fifteen. In 1981 two further committees were 
added and one more was added in 1987, 1992 and 1994. By the end of the fourth parliamen-
tary period (June 1999) there were a total of twenty standing committees in place and despite 
some attempts to reduce this number during the course of the 5th Parliament, there remain 
twenty full committees today (2008), with several well established sub-committees also. MEPs 
can serve in a full capacity on more than one committee but one full committee assignment and 
one substitute position is the norm. Seats on committees are assigned proportionately to party 
strength and a majority of committees lie within one seat of perfect proportionality (McElroy 
2006). 
Our understanding of the committee assignment process is undoubtedly most fully developed 
in the case of the US Congress. But even here, there is little consensus on the role of political 
parties in the process. The self-selection model advocated by Shepsle and Weingast (1987) and 
Weingast and Marshall (1988) views the committee system as an institution that has evolved to 
serve the re-election needs of party members. Members choose committee seats on the basis of 
their constituent interests and party leaders largely comply with member requests. Rural members 
will opt for the agricultural committee while urban members will opt for the transport committee 
etc. Norms such as that of seniority have evolved to limit leadership discretion and reduce intra-
party competition for key committee positions. 
An alternative view of the assignment process is put forward by Cox and McCubbins (1993) 
who posit that political parties, in particular majority parties, are legislative cartels that organise 
the legislature in such a fashion as to control policy outcomes. With regard to committee assign-
ments, this theory argues that the party leadership is central to the process and party loyalty is a 
critical determinant of transfers to exclusive and semi-exclusive committees. Damgaard (1995) 
has found some evidence that the assignment and reappointment process is also used by political 
parties in the parliamentary democracies of Europe as a source of reward and punishment. He 
found, for instance, that refusal of reappointment to committees occurs in the UK, Switzerland 
and Italy, though the extent to which this takes place is not quantified. 
In the case of the European Parliament committee membership is officially established twice 
during the course of the five-year legislative period, in the immediate part-session following 
elections and again half way through the five-year term. Unlike the case of the US Congress there 
is a large movement of MEPs between committees at both of these time points. Table 1 provides 
an overview of the extent of committee transfers in the period 1989–1999. During this period, 
upwards of a third of MEPs changed committees from one half session to the next. In this article 
I explore if there is something systematic about these high turnover rates? Why do MEP move 
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with such regularity from one committee to another? How do political groups decide between 
two members vying for one committee seat? 
Table	1: Percentage of MEP’s transferring between committees 1989–1999
Political Group 1989 1992 1994 1997 1999
Party of the European Socialists 41 (101) 38 (184) 43 (105) 23 (214) 38 (100)
European People’s Party 33 (70) 34 (125) 44 (72) 27 (180) 41 (102)
European Liberal Democrats 57 (21) 55 (47) 57 (14) 40 (40) 40 (15)
Greens 50  (6) 56 (30) 57  (7) 21 (28) 33 (12)
GUE/NGL 33 (9) 53 (28) 71 (14) 48 (33) 81 (16)
Column Total 207 414 212 495 245
Figures in parenthesis represent the total number of cases.
Data compiled by the author from the annual List of Members of the European Parliament.
Key to the theoretical argument to be tested in this paper is the fact that the party leadership of 
the political groups controls the assignment process in the EP. I will use this fact to test the hy-
pothesis that the parties use the assignment process to punish those who rebel against the party. 
It is apparent that the political groups recognised the potential of the committee system as a 
source of patronage (and by extension control) as early as the first directly elected legislature. In 
1981, for instance, the position of substitute was formalised and control of the position was 
transferred from the individual MEP to the Political Group. Prior to this “any member of a com-
mittee [could] arrange for his place to be taken at meetings by another Member of Parliament of 
his choice” (Chapter X Rule of Procedure 40:3 1978). In addition, by the beginning of the second 
Parliament (1984) all requests for seats on a committee had to be channelled through an MEPs 
political group; prior to this they could be submitted directly to the Parliamentary Bureau. These 
changes would lend some credibility to the notion that the Political Groups recognised the com-
mittee system as a potential supply of incentives and patronage for otherwise highly constrained 
parties. In sum I hypothesise that: 
H1: The Party leadership of the Political Groups in the European Parliament use selective 
incentives in the form of attractive committee assignments to reward party loyalists and 
punish those who rebel. 
3.  Committee Hierarchies
The argument outlined in the previous section rests on the assumption that not all committee 
seats are of equal value. If the committee system is to be used as a source of reward, then by 
definition, some committee seats must be more highly prized than others. Precise predictions 
about what assignment a particular MEP will prefer will in part be dictated by personal policy 
preferences but it is maintained here that whatever the motivational mix of a given MEP, he will 
strictly prefer to be on a committee that is policy influential as opposed to one which is not. 
In the European Parliament some committees are key in the legislative process whilst oth-
ers are merely consultative and have no direct impact on policy output. Anecdotal evidence 
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suggests that MEPs are fully aware of the differences between the legislative powers of the com-
mittees and that there is serious competition for membership of committees with law-making 
powers. As one former European People’s Party (EPP) member of Parliament put it succinctly: 
“The crux of the committee system is the question of which committee has power.”1 A British 
Labour MEP further suggested that while his true preferences lay in one committee’s jurisdiction 
he “chose Legal Affairs because it has real powers under co-decision unlike EMAC [European 
and Monetary Affairs Committee]”.2 Elite interviews further suggest that the assignment process 
itself is subject to much infighting within parties. One British member of the European Liberal 
Democrats commented:
The assignment of members to committees reflects one’s standing in the Parliament, you 
could actually use this as an indicator of one’s standing in parliament, and the request for 
particular committee positions is always highly contentious.3
Unfortunately, no definitive rank ordering of committees in the EP exists. And while it is rela-
tively easy to differentiate between the very powerful and very weak committee, systematically 
ranking the other committees is problematic. The importance of committees may change over 
time and given the level of institutional transformation in the European Parliament in recent 
decades one should expect the metrics of committee importance to change from one Parliament 
to the next. Ideally, to come up with a rank ordering of committees one would have member 
specific valuation of committee seats but in the absence of such information standard methods 
to rank committee examine transfer patterns.
In this paper I use the Groseclose and Stewart (1998) measure of committee rank to arrive 
at a rank ordering of committees. This method has several advantages over earlier methods 
proposed by Bullock and Sprague (1969) and Munger (1988). First and foremost, it overcomes 
the problems that arise when transfers between committees do not involve one for one movement. 
For instance it can take account of situations in which a member gives up two committee seats 
for one committee assignment. Second, the traditional methods view transfers between commit-
tees in isolation. That is, they only consider the relationship between the transferred from com-
mittee and the committee to which a member transfers. These ranking systems do not take into 
account the quality of the “opposition”. Groseclose and Stewart argue that committee ranks are 
similar to rankings in competitive sports. Simply looking at the number of wins and losses can 
be very misleading. Winning against a strong team should count for more than winning against 
a weak opponent. 
The Groseclose and Stewart method considers transfers as a competition between one com-
mittee and one or more competing committees. For each set of adjacent committee periods a 
matrix of (N) members by (M) committees is created.4 The committee transferred to ‘wins’ the 
contest, achieving a score of 1. The committee(s) transferred from loses, getting a score of –1. 
Committees not involved in the transfer process are scored as zero. Estimates of the probability 
of this data actually occurring are then calculated through maximum likelihood estimation.5 The 
resulting coefficients essentially represent the average of the members’ evaluations of a given 
committee. Table 2 presents the results of this analysis for the 1989–1992 committee period in 
the European Parliament.6 
The standard errors are rather large and this does undermine our confidence in the accuracy 
of these rankings. To compute the Grosecloses and Stewart rankings we need a reasonably large 
n. In the case of the US Congress, many Congresses are estimated together to ensure this result. 
362		 Gail	McElroy
The assumption made in this case is that committee values do not change over time, however 
this is clearly not valid in the context of the EP. In addition, there is the problem that transfers 
may represent promotions in terms of obtaining a committee position such as a chairmanship. 
Members may relinquish a position on a high demand committee for a chairmanship on a low 
demand committee and none of these rankings can take account of this type of movement. Nor-
mally, all things being equal, a member would not choose to move from, for example, the Envi-
ronment Committee to the Transport Committee but if there is a chairmanship position involved 
such a move may be attractive to some members. Given the large standard errors, I am reluctant 
to use the actual Groseclose and Stewart Portfolio values as the dependent variable in the analy-
sis, which follows.7 
The major problem with any measure based on transfers is that we do not have a ranking 
system that is independent of the actual transfers. One must be concerned that these rankings will 
be biased if a large number of the transfers are not revealed preferences but rather are punishments 
or demotions imposed by the party leadership.  To use these measure we have to make the as-
sumption that all transfers are voluntary, as I argue this is not the case, these measures are un-
doubtedly biased. If we take this point to its logical conclusion, if all committee seats were 
punishments, the ranks would reveal not committee prestige but rather the opposite, the undesir-
ability of committees. Fortunately, we do have theoretical reasons to expect certain committees 
to be more desirable than others and an alternative means of ranking the committees, independ-
ent of the actual transfer patterns, acts as an additional test of the ranking derived. Each commit-
tee has a chairman and upwards of three vice-chairs who are chosen by the committees at the 
inaugural meeting of the committee. In practice these positions are divided up amongst the po-
litical groups in advance of these inaugural meetings in proportion to party size by the d’Hondt 
method. For instance, in 1989 the Party of European Socialists (PES) with 180 members was 
Table	2:	Ranking of EP Committees: 1989–1992
Committee Coeff. Standard Error Rank
Environment ∞ n.a. 1
Industry and Research ∞ n.a. 1
Economic and Monetary .93 .47 3
Development .65 .39 4
Legal .57 .37 5
Foreign Affairs .56 .31 6
Employment .54 .36 7
Agriculture .28 .34 8
Transport .27 .75 9
Culture .26 .47 10
External Economic Relations -.03 .42 11
Regional -.15 .34 12
Budgets -.38 .45 13
N= 162
LL=-101.04
n.a= not applicable
	 	 Committees	and	Party	Cohesion	in	the	European	Parliament	 363
entitled to the chairs of the first, third, fifth seventh, ninth, twelfth, fifteenth and seventeenth com-
mittees. The EPP with 121 members was entitled to the second, fourth, eighth, eleventh and 
eighteenth committee chairs. The Liberal Democratic and Reformist Group (LDR) got their choice 
of the sixth and sixteenth committees, the European Democrats (ED), the Greens and the Euro-
pean United Left (GUE) got the tenth, thirteenth and fourteenth choices respectively. These 
choices are one means of independently verifying the results from the Groseclose and Stewart 
measure used above. In 1989, for the first time in the history of the directly elected Parliament, 
the Environment committee was taken as the first choice committee (Corbett et al.1995). This 
conforms with rational expectations, given that the Environment Committee benefited most from 
the institutional reforms introduced by the Single European Act. It also corroborates the rankings 
that derive from the Groseclose-Stewart method used above. The Greens chose the Regional 
Policy committee in thirteenth place and the GUE chose Culture in the fourteenth slot, confirm-
ing evidence from the Groseclose-Stewart ranking that these committees are not in high demand. 
We know that the EPP chose Foreign Affairs, Economic and Monetary and Legal affairs com-
mittees as its first three choices, thereby placing all three committees in the top eight. In addition, 
the PES placed Development in the twelfth places in committee rankings, suggesting that the 
rank of this committee by the Grosewart method may be artificially elevated. 
The alternative methods of ranking committees for the period 1989–1992 correspond rea-
sonably well (though not perfectly) and I use the information supplied by each to arrive at a 
basic division of committees into three types; exclusive, semi-exclusive and non-exclusive. 
Table 3 represents this trichotomisation of committees. The classification is admittedly not un-
problematic; the exclusive category may be inflated for example. It includes, for instance, all five 
committees that received legislative powers under the Single European Act. But these committees 
were not equally affected.8 And as such the dependent variable, demotion, may be understated. 
Certain demotions will be obvious, to move from the Environment Committee to the Culture 
Committee is a clear downward movement, but it is not clear if a move from the Environment 
Committee to the Legal Affairs Committee is a demotion or not. The trichotomisation thus errs 
on the side of caution. 
Table	3: Classification of Committees
Committee Type Committee
Exclusive Environment
Industry
Economic and Monetary
Legal
Foreign Affairs
Employment
Semi-Exclusive External Economic Relations
Agriculture
Budgets
Non-Exclusive Culture
Development
Regional 
Transport
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3.1.	Dependent	variable
DEMOTION: I use demotion rather than promotion as the unit of analysis in this section because 
it directly captures the notion of party discipline and “individually targeted punishments” (Rasch 
1999, 123). It is not clear that toeing the party line is sufficient cause for promotion, but if parties 
have some central authority, defectors will need to be punished. Also the possibility of demotion 
through the committee systems is an interesting variation for scholars of legislative organization. 
In the US Congress it is almost impossible to remove a member from a committee, given the 
so-called ‘property right’ norm of reappointment.
In this analysis, a member who transfers from an exclusive to semi-exclusive or non-exclu-
sive committee is considered to be demoted and coded 1. Similarly, a transfer from the semi-
exclusive committee to a non-exclusive committee is considered a demotion. Members who do 
not transfer, transfer among committees within the same category, or move from a low to high 
ranked committed are coded as zero. Using this classification system approximately 8 percent 
of members of both the PES and EPP are demoted at the halfway point through the Third Parlia-
ment (January 1992). If we also count those members who lost committee offices but remained 
on the same committee as demotions, there are just over 10 percent of members from both parties 
classified as being demoted.
In this section the analysis is confined to the years covered by the 3rd Parliament (1989–1994). 
I have additionally chosen to examine the transfer process for the second half of the 3rd Parlia-
mentary session (January 1992) for a number of reasons. During the first half legislative session 
of each parliament upwards of a half of MEPs are freshmen.9 Thus, it is very difficult at this point 
to predict the loyalty of any given MEP. It will not be clear which MEPs from this group of 
newcomers will serve best on which committees. However, at the half-way point through any 
given Parliament party leaders have had two and half years of observations for each individual 
member, they thus can make more informed decisions. In addition, party representation on com-
mittees is established during the first half of the Parliamentary session, so movements are not 
undertaken to accord with factors such as proportionality or geographic balance; these factors 
remain constant and thus need not perturb the analysis.
3.2.	Independent	variables
The key predictor variable is LOYALTY. Undoubtedly, party leaders take several factors into 
account when assigning seats to particular members: geographic balance, members’ policy ex-
pertise, previous political experience to name but a few (Damgaard 1995). Here we are inter-
ested in measuring the impact of loyalty as exhibited in votes in plenary. Undoubtedly, loyalty 
is only partially captured through such a measure but it is undeniable that the most public dem-
onstration of loyalty or dissent is through the process of voting on the floor of the house. While 
the majority of votes do not record individual MEP voting behaviour and roll call votes are almost 
certainly unrepresentative of votes in general (Carrubba et al. 2006) for the purposes of this 
paper this is not a problem. Roll call votes are certainly called to assess the level of party coher-
ence on an issue. To vote against the party leadership on the floor is perhaps the clearest means 
of rebelling against the party. In this paper I examine if the party does indeed discipline these 
renegades in terms of committee assignments. 
The measure employed here to capture individual members loyalty is a weighted logit 
technique first developed by Zeller and Lee (1965) and more recently employed by Coker and 
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Crain (1994). I have chosen to use this method rather than the linear method employed by Cox 
and McCubbins (1993), as it takes account of the fact that votes are generated by a binomial 
process; a member votes either yes or no on a proposal.10 The index captures the frequency with 
which the ith member votes with the party leadership. Specifically, let n be the number of votes 
on which a member actually votes. Let r be the number of times the member votes with his 
party leadership. The loyalty index is then defined as follows:
λ i = log [(r i +.5)/((n- r i) + .5)]
As n is a finite quantity, when r=0 or r=n the tails of the loyalty index will underestimate the 
members loyalty score.11 In these situations the individuals may have been even more loyal or 
less loyal if n was not a finite quantity. In these instances the loyalty index is adjusted by the 
procedure developed in Gart and Zweifel (1967) and Kalt and Zupan (1984):
If r=0 λ i  = ((log ((r i +.5)/((n- r i) + .5)))-.5)
If r=n λi  = (log ((r i +.5)/((n- r i) + .5)))+.5)
The resulting loyalty score is an unbounded log-odds ratio that increases monotonically with the 
rate of voting with party leadership. Loyalty is thus constructed to reflect the frequency, fi, with 
which the ith party member casts a vote with the party leadership (see below).12 
Sample of Votes: Which sample of floor votes should we examine? The very fact that a 
roll call vote is called is perhaps indication that the vote is important or that the political groups 
are unsure of how the vote will proceed. Nonetheless, we expect party leaders to be less inclined 
to punish members who vote against the party on non-legislative issues. In this analysis only 
roll call votes on legislative referrals under the co-operation procedure are used. It was only 
in these instances that the parliament was a true legislative body for the period under examina-
tion. Thus votes on motions of resolution or votes that fall under the consultation procedure 
are excluded from the analysis. A random sample of 160 such votes was collected from the 
Official Journal of the European Communities, Series C for the period July 1989–December 
1991.13
The party leadership vote on each of these votes was identified for both of the major parties, 
the EPP and PES. In this analysis, the party leadership is defined as the president of the party 
and the vice-presidents from the largest national delegations. In the case of the PES the party 
leadership was taken to be the party president and the leaders of the British, German and Span-
ish delegations.14 In the case of the EPP the leadership was defined as the party president and the 
leaders of the Italian and German delegations, which were substantially larger than any other 
national delegations.15 Elite interviews suggest that the larger delegations within the Political 
Groups are favoured in all internal party matters. Votes on which the party leaders were divided 
are excluded from the analysis. Surprisingly such excluded votes were low in number. Of the 
160 votes in the sample only three were excluded on the basis that the (PES) party leadership 
were divided on the matter. Only two such votes were excluded for the EPP. In addition, a hand-
ful of votes were excluded for the PES when all members of a particular national delegation 
voted against the party leadership position. In such instances, it is plausible that members are 
voting on the grounds of ‘constituency’ interests and are allowed some leeway by the party 
leadership.
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A number of other independent variables are also included in the analysis, the first of which 
is seniority. It is not clear if seniority is a norm in the European Parliament. Bowler and Farrell 
(1995, 240) argue that seniority is irrelevant. However, their analysis does not take account of 
the very particular assignment rules in the EP. Elite interview evidence suggests that seniority 
may play some role in the assignment process though it cannot operate to the extent it does in 
the US Congress. There is such a high turnover amongst MEPs that a seniority system in the 
traditional sense cannot function. Freshmen MEPs do end up on high prestige committees and 
have even been known to get chairmanships. Nonetheless, we do have some evidence that senior-
ity is not irrelevant. Table 4 displays the distribution of seats by freshmen versus non-freshmen 
for the Third through Fifth Parliaments and some noticeable differences emerge. High profile 
committees such as Foreign Affairs and Legal Affairs have a much higher number of returning 
MEPs than low prestige committees such as Culture or Regional Policy. Over the course of these 
three parliaments, the low prestige Regional Policy committee had twenty-one fewer returning 
MEPs than expected if there was no seniority norm in operation. 
Long-standing members may be given some preference in committee assignments and they may 
have the right to remain on these committees having established some policy expertise in the 
area. In this analysis the concept of seniority is captured by two terms. YEARS simply refers to 
the number of years the member has served in the EP. TENURE on the other hand captures the 
number of terms that a given MEP has served on the committee on which he is currently a mem-
ber. The two terms are necessary to capture the difference between deference to policy expertise 
in a given area and simple deference to long standing Members of Parliament.16  
Table	4:	Non-Freshmen Seat Advantage on standing committees 1989–1999
Committee N Actual number of 
non-freshman MEPs
Expected Number 
of non-freshman 
MEPs
Non-freshman 
advantage
Foreign Affairs 184 109 94.8 14.2
Agriculture 133 67 68.5 -1.5
Budgets 118 66 60.8 5.2
Economic and Monetary 165 78 85.0 -7.0
Research and Technology 76 40 39.2 0.8
External Economic 
Relations
63 32 32.5 -0.5
Legal Affairs 95 66 48.9 11.1
Employment 146 69 75.2 -6.2
Regional Policy 128 44 65.9 -21.9
Transport 78 35 40.2 -5.2
Environment 153 81 78.8 2.2
Culture 102 37 52.5 -15.5
Development 109 53 56.2 -3.2
Data compiled by author from the Melemsfortegnelse (List of Members) of the European Parliament.
	 	 Committees	and	Party	Cohesion	in	the	European	Parliament	 367
H2: A member’s chance of being demoted is inversely related to the length of term he has 
served in the EP.
H2a: A member’s probability of demotion decreases with the length of term he has served 
on a particular committee.
An additional control variable included in the analysis is ATTENDANCE, the inclusion of this 
variable is important as the European Parliament has traditionally suffered from high degrees of 
absenteeism. It may be the case that simply participating in the legislative process may have an 
impact on maintaining one’s committee position. MEPs who actively participate in the parlia-
mentary process may be more likely to maintain their positions than those who are persistently 
absent.  Simply turning up may count for rather a lot in the EP.
H3: Members who participate in the legislative process are less likely to be demoted than 
absentee MEPs.
Fully capturing the extent of an MEP’s participation is somewhat difficult. Ideally one would 
have a measure that quantified participation in committee, on the floor and in the political group 
itself. However, in the absence (at present) of such a measure we will use participation in roll 
call voting in Strasbourg as a proxy measure. This measure probably overstates the degree of 
participation by MEPs. Turning up for the once monthly Strasbourg session affords an MEP more 
visibility than participating in committee or party activities in Brussels. If an MEP is going to 
participate in only one activity it is reasonable to assume that this would be tuning up for the 
plenary sessions. Using 290 votes randomly selected from the period of July 1989 to December 
1991, I calculate the ATTENDANCE variable by dividing the number of times that each indi-
vidual member actually votes by the total number of votes. The number of actual votes ranges 
from a low of 16 to a high of 270 for the PES. 
The final control variable included in the analysis is NATIONALITY. There may be some 
advantage to belonging to the larger national delegations within a political group. These delega-
tions tend to dominate the party leadership. Interviews with MEPs from small national delegation 
in both the EPP and PES suggest that this factor may not be trivial. One Irish member of the EPP 
suggested that 
Nothing in the EP is a meritocracy, the thing to be is a member of a large delegation in a 
large party, allocation of reports, rapporteur positions etc. are completely done on this 
basis.17 
NATIONALITY is a dummy variable coded 1 if the member belongs to the German, Spanish or 
English delegation for the PES and zero otherwise. Coded 1 for Germans and Italians from the 
EPP and zero otherwise. 
H4: Members from large delegations are less likely to be demoted than members from small 
delegations.
ATTENDANCE and LOYALTY are also included as an interaction terms as it is hypothesised 
that the impact of participation is not equal for all levels of loyalty.
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3.3.	Analysis	and	results
The following model was estimated for both the largest parties, the PES and EPP: 
Prob (Y=1) = Λ(β0+ β1years+ β2Term+ β3Nation+β4Loyalty+β5Prescence+ 
β6Prescence*Loyalty)
Where Λ represents the logistic cumulative distribution function and Y= Demotion=1. 
Only the two major parties are included in the analysis, as the number of seats that the smaller 
parties have on each committee is very small and gives rise to some serious sample size problems. 
The third largest group at this time, the Liberals, had a mere 45 members or roughly two members 
per committee.  In addition, many of the smaller parties are very fluid in nature and are probably 
not promoting party discipline in the manner exhibited by the two dominant groups.
The hypotheses outlined above provide some expectations about the signs on the coefficients. 
Hypotheses 2 and 2a lead me to believe that the estimate of β1 (YEARS) and β2 (TENURE) will 
be negative. The longer a member has served in both the Parliament and on a given committee, 
the less likely he is to be demoted. Hypothesis 1 leads me to expect that the sign on LOYALTY 
should also be negative, less loyal members should be demoted. Similarly, the sign on ATTEND-
ANCE should be negative. 
Table	5: Logistic Regression Probability of Demotion 1992
Variable PES
Model 1
EPP
Model 1
PES
Model 2
EPP
Model 2
Loyalty -2.07**
(.941)
-1.50*
(.85)
-1.83**
(.95)
-2.14**
(1.33)
Years -.044
(.096)
.002
(.13)
-.03
(.10)
-.03
(.14)
Tenure -.384
(.558)
-.263
(.46)
-.50
(1.22)
-.45
(.50)
Nationality -.918
(.831)
-.637
(1.17)
-.97
(.85)
-.70
(1.18)
Attendance -8.54**
(4.20)
-2.35
((5.5)
-8.07**
(4.43)
-2.45
(6.72)
Loyalty*Attendance 2.399*
(1.40)
.80
(1.78)
2.18
(1.48)
1.01
(2.14)
Constant 5.493**
(2.50)
3.08
(2.70)
4.96**
(2.60)
5.69
(3.99)
Number of Cases 174 112 138 87
Percent Correct 82 90 91 85
-2LL 111.36 99.01 71.93 66.04
Note: **significant at the p<.05 level, * significant at the p<.10 level
Standard errors in parentheses
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The results are presented as Model 1 in Table 5. The results are largely consistent with 
expectations. Looking first at the results for the PES we see that all the signs are in the expected 
direction and that the coefficients on ATTENDANCE and LOYALTY are significant. Interest-
ingly, the coefficients on NATIONALITY, YEARS and TENURE are not significant. For the 
EPP all the signs are in the expected direction also but only LOYALTY approaches standard 
significance levels. 
Figure 1 captures the impact of ATTENDANCE and LOYALTY on demotion in the PES. The 
variables YEARS, TENURE and NATIONALITY were insignificant and set at their mean values. 
The probability reported is the probability of being demoted. As expected members who ex-
hibit low levels of loyalty and who do not turn up regularly have a high probability of being 
demoted.  However, a member who is very loyal to the party and participates in 80 percent of 
votes has merely a 10 percent chance of being demoted. As the graph reveals the impact of par-
ticipation is not equal for all levels of loyalty. The results indicate that turning up counted for a 
great deal in the European Parliament in 1992. In the next section I examine if participation 
continues to be a sufficient condition for retaining one’s committee position in later Parliaments. 
As parties institutionalise loyalty may become more highly valued. 
Figure	1:	PES Probability of Demotion by level of loyalty 1992
The committee assignment process is dynamic in nature and here we have only taken a cross-
sectional look at the process. The above analysis is open to the criticism that by including all the 
MEPs in the analysis we may be including some renegade members who have already “bottomed 
out”. That is, an MEP serving on the non-exclusive committees in a non-office holding position 
cannot be demoted any further.  On the other hand, members on these committees may be also 
very loyal in their voting patterns in the hope of getting promoted to a more exclusive committee. 
Two countervailing processes may be at work concurrently. Model 2 in Table 5 reports the results 
from the analysis excluding those members of both parties who were in non-office positions on 
non-exclusive committees (that is members who could not be demoted further). The results are 
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consistent with the findings reported for the larger sample suggesting that these committees are 
not composed of a disproportionate number of party rebels. 
The models presented here are extremely parsimonious but they correctly predict about 
85–90% of cases. The success of the models is encouraging when one considers that no indi-
vidual characteristics of MEPs or their policy preferences are contained within the models; we 
have assumed that each member has the same preference ranking over committees. The depend-
ent variable is also not particularly refined; the category of exclusive committee is undoubtedly 
over inflated. Nonetheless, loyalty is clearly a significant and substantively important variable 
in the promotion game for both of these parties. 
4.  Robustness of Results
The above analysis is confined to one parliamentary period and in this section we briefly test the 
robustness of the results by applying the theoretical model to a more recent legislative session, 
the Fifth Parliament (1999–2004). In addition, in this section rather than looking at demotions I 
examine if MEPs who are particularly loyal to the political group are promoted through the com-
mittee system using an alternative measure of the key independent variable loyalty. 
In the analysis that is presented in Table 6 I examine the likelihood that a member of the 
EPP who is loyal to his party is rewarded with a promotion though the committee system. As in 
the previous analysis, the rank ordering of committees for the time period (1999-2004) was 
derived by the Groseclose-Stewart maximum likelihood method.18 The key theoretical concept, 
loyalty, is here measured as the absolute DISTANCE of a member from the median member of 
his party on first dimension NOMINATE scores. These scores are derived from an analysis of 
roll call votes and are a good indication of the degree to which an MEP votes with his or her 
political party.19 The smaller this absolute distance the more loyal an MEP in this analysis, hence 
we expect a negative sign on this variable.  That is, as the distance between an MEP and the 
median member of his party increases the probability of being promoted should decrease. TEN-
URE, YEARS and ATTENDANCE are measured as before. NATIONALITY is again a simple 
dummy variable coded 1 if the member belongs to the German, Italian or English delegation and 
zero otherwise. 
As the results in Table 6 clearly indicate, DISTANCE is both significant and in the ex-
pected direction. The further an MEP is from the party’s median position, the less likely he is to 
be promoted. NATIONALITY is the only other significant variable and the sign suggests that 
MEPs from larger delegations are less likely to be promoted, perhaps due to greater competition 
within large delegations for such positions, though this hypothesis needs much further explora-
tion. ATTENDANCE is no longer significant, turning up is not sufficient grounds for promotion 
in 2002. This is not surprising as the EP professionalized significantly in the ten years from 1992 
onwards and levels of absenteeism significantly declined (Hix et al. 2007).  For ease of interpre-
tation Figure 2 graphs the impact of loyalty on the probability of promotion within the EPP for 
this period. As expected, members who exhibit high levels of loyalty (or have a low absolute 
distance from the party median in terms of their NOMINATE scores) have a much higher prob-
ability of being promoted.  Overall these results suggest that the theoretical model is quite robust 
to different measures of the key concept of loyalty and to conceiving of the dependent variable 
both in terms of demotion and promotion. In addition, the results suggest that the model is ap-
plicable to very different legislative sessions of the European Parliament. 
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Table	6: Logistic Regression of Probability of Promotion in EPP 2002
Variable EPP Model
Distance -0.317*
(.150)
Nationality -0.847**
(2.98)
Attendance 0.860
(0.45)
Distance*Attendance 0.388*
(2.20)
Tenure -0.066
(0.58)
Years -0.006
(0.08)
Constant -2.377
(1.38)
Number of Cases 204
Percent Correct 87
-2LL 145
Note: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Figure	2:	EPP Probability of promotion by level of loyalty in 2002
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5.  Concluding Remarks
The analysis in this paper demonstrates that even before the EP became a full actor in the legis-
lative processes of the European Union, loyalty to the party leadership had its rewards. The 
evidence is strong that members who turned up and voted with the party were much less likely 
to be demoted than absentee and renegade MEPs. The results indicate that there is a significant 
and positive relationship between voting behaviour and transfer patterns among committees. 
These results are significant because they suggest, contrary to conventional wisdom, that the two 
largest political groups were in the process of consolidation even as the Parliament got its first 
significant powers. Parties with few means at their disposal to sanction rebel members have used 
the internal organisation of the Parliament, in particular the committee system, to attempt to 
enforce party discipline.  There is also evidence to suggest that this process is not confined to 
one particular Parliament. The obvious extension of the analysis in this paper is to explore 
whether the findings hold in all Parliaments and in particular to see if the enlargement of the EP 
in 2004 had a significant impact on the ability of the political groups to sanction their members. 
In addition, future work should explore whether such mechanisms to sanction unruly members 
have been adopted by the smaller political groups. 
NOTES
1 Interview, November 2000.
2 Interview, March 2000. 
3 Interview, March 2000.
4 Data on committee assignments was collected from the committee listings in the Medlemsfortegnelse (List of Mem-
bers) published each year. 
5 The matrix of transfers with some manipulation can be estimated as a standard probit equation.
6 In this paper the analysis concentrates primarily on the years covered by the 3rd Parliament (1989–1994). This was 
the first parliamentary session in which the EP had significant legislative powers, in the form of the co-operation 
procedure. By choosing to examine this period rather than subsequent periods in which the Parliament gained more 
powers, I hope to demonstrate that the political groups consciously attempted to build strong organizations, even 
when the means at their disposal were limited. 
7 There is a considerable overlap between these results and those from the Munger and Bullock and Sprague methods 
applied to the same data (McElroy 2003) and it is reassuring that the results by and large reflect the results obtained 
from these alternative measures. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail the methodology by which 
these various alternative ranks are derived and the problems inherent in using committee to committee transfer pat-
terns as the basis for rank ordering committees. 
8 For instance, less than 10 percent of reports adopted in plenary and which fell under the co-operation procedure 
emanated from the Employment committee while a quarter came from the Economic committee.
9 In the 1989 Parliament, 49 percent of MEPs were freshmen.
10 Strictly speaking, votes are either yes, no or abstain in the European Parliament. 
11 There are no actual instances in the data used in this analysis in which r = 0 but there are several instances in which 
r = 100, indicating that these MEPs never voted against the party leadership. 
12 The mean loyalty score for the 112 members of the EPP is 3.56 and for the 174 members of the PES is 3.27.
13 This total represents almost 70 percent of such votes for this period. 
14 These three delegations constitute approximately 60 percent of PES members at this time.
15 These two delegations constitute just over 45 percent of EPP membership but are each considerably larger than the 
next largest delegation.
16 These two variables are obviously correlated but due to the high transfer rates in the EP, not by any means per-
fectly correlated. The correlation for the PES is .654 and for the EPP it is .725.
17 Personal Interview, March 2000.
18 For reasons of space these tables are not presented here but are available from the author upon request. 
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19 The NOMINATE scores were calculated using a sample of 1500 votes for the time period July 1999 to December 
2001. For more on the application of NOMINATE to roll call voting in the EP see Hix et al. (2007) or McElroy 
(2007). 
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